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There is little doubt that growing numbers of citizens are disenchanted with formal politics in Great Britain. Mirroring a trend observed in other so-called advanced or established democracies across the Euro-American world (Braconnier and Dormagen 2014; Dalton 2004; Pharr, et al. 2000; Putnam 2004) those from low socio-economic backgrounds are amongst the most likely to withdraw from electoral participation (Pattie, et al. 2004 ).
Disenchantment with electoral politics does not mean that people stop engaging with their elected representatives. People on the margins mediate what they experience as a distant political system by vernacularizing politics in their own ways. England's council estates offer a point in case. These estates are state-built housing developments for the working classes, although over decades many have become home to the poorest sectors of the population. On the estates where I carried out ethnographic fieldwork, residents are so profoundly alienated from the political system that they frequently describe politics as part of an alien world of "them" opposed to the "local community" or "us." Yet residents continue to build personal relations with locally based politicians. Where the latter succeed in becoming active in localized networks of support and care that are central to residents' daily struggles for security and survival, fragile alliances between residents and politicians emerge on the back of which politicians can mobilize electoral support.
An ethnographic focus on vernacular politics engages critically with ongoing concerns about the democratic crisis. Politicians, policy-makers and some academics tend to present popular disenchantment with politics in terms of narratives of civic crisis and voter apathy. Those who withdraw from electoral processes are blamed for their failure to exercise their duties as citizens at the ballot box. These portrayals, however, fail to acknowledge that people on the margins do not see voting as an exercise in abstract or depersonalized rights but as part of a personalized exchange relationship that is centered on politicians' involvement in localized acts of support and the logic that governs them. Where politicians fail to live up to the obligations inherent in such relationships, this can generate feelings of betrayal and electoral support is withdrawn. The limits of personalized politics provide an indication of the dismantling of the political left in the contemporary neo-liberal conjuncture. They also demonstrate the need to account for the lived realities of social class in aspirational narratives of "alternative" democratic futures (Hardt and Negri 2012; Juris 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 2012) . I conducted ethnographic fieldwork over eighteen months between 2009 and 2011 and for shorter periods since then up until 2015. During my initial fieldwork, I lived on two council estates in a single city, situated in the southeast, roughly an hour's drive from London. While the city ranks amongst the wealthiest cities in the country, its council estates have been heavily affected by industrial decline and, like many other estates in the country (Rogaly and Taylor 2009) , are stigmatized in the public imagination as places for the "underclass." The bulk of my research was concentrated on an estate of roughly 11,000 residents of mainly white British descent but with a sizeable minority of people of Afro-Caribbean, African and increasingly Eastern European backgrounds. My research focused on those who see 5 themselves as "local residents" (who are mostly the residents of white British and AfroCaribbean descent) who have strong connections to the place, often through a family history tied to the city and its industrial history. The majority of them live in socially or privately rented housing on the estate as they cannot afford to become property-owners. They also count amongst the sector of the population that are most likely to withdraw from electoral participation (Pattie, et al. 2004 ).
Crisis, democracy, and anthropology Across the political spectrum, politicians and policy makers have taken widespread voter withdrawal and declining political participation as evidence of a civic crisis that is affecting Britain. According to this view, popular disenchantment with the political system is symptomatic of a declining civic society. In the aftermath of the 2001 UK general elections, a House of Commons Select Committee stated: "we find it extraordinary that [the] collapse in electoral participation, put alongside other evidence on civic disengagement, has not been treated as a civic crisis demanding appropriate response" (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2001). Policy makers across the political spectrum have suggested that to reinvigorate democracy, incentives to participate (such as through the introduction of compulsory voting) must be increased. This discourse of civic crisis bears resonance with modernist narratives in which prominent sociologists have lamented the alleged decline of social capital in late modern societies, and the ensuing apathy that is said to have replaced once close-knit communities and received forms of sociability and trust (e.g. Putnam 2004; Beck and Beck-Gernstein 2001) .
The narrative of civic decline offered by politicians, policy-makers, and sociologists ignores the ways in which the current moment is marked by what Nugent (2012) has referred to as the "dual crisis of global capitalism and representative democracy." In the decades since World War II, strong welfare policies and labor laws created the conditions for a relatively inclusive, if by no means equal, society.
1 Large sections of the working and middle class population were still "captured" by mainstream politics (Nugent 2012 Political theorists and sociologists have described the crisis as indicative of the emergence of a "post-democratic" (Crouch 2004) or "post-political" (Ranciere 1999) state. This does not imply that democracy was ever a reality as the pre-fix "post" in "post-democracy" may suggest (Ramsay 2013, 13) . Private property interests were at the heart of liberal democracy from its inception (Hardt and Negri 2011) . However, as Nugent has pointed out, if "economic elites have always been in a position to capture the political domain […] the manner in which they have done so, and the relationships they have established with subordinate groups in the process, has changed through time" (2012, 181) . Democracy today seems to have become a personal attribute of the privileged few (Friedmann 2003, 28) . Friedmann describes a bifurcation that has taken place whereby politicians celebrate the transnational solidarity of an international community that endorses hybridity and multiculturalism as a marker of identity and inclusion (2003; see also Friedmann and Friedmann 2013) . By contrast, public discourses about the "underclass" in the UK and the US (Wacquant 2009; Welshman 2006) , 7 the "marginal mass" in Brazil (Perlman 2010) , and "internal orientalism" in Eastern Europe degrade the working classes as a political group (Kalb 2009 ).
New actors have come to fill the gap that has opened up between the people left behind and political elites. As Kalb (2009, 208) says "actual outcomes on local grounds are intermediated by various path-dependent 'critical junctions' that link global processes via particular national arenas and local histories, often hidden, to emergent and situated events and narratives" (see also Kalb 2011) . "Critical junctions" include the rise of populist working class parties across Europe and beyond (Braconnier and Mayer 2015; Friedmann 2003; Gingrich and Banks 2005) . These movements capitalize on widespread feelings of anxiety and paranoia by those on the margins through inverting the discourse of cosmopolitanism deployed by elites and through relying on a language of rootedness. In this process, they often appeal to a far right rhetoric that mobilizes tropes of victimhood along nationalist, ethnic or radically local lines. In the UK, the far-right British National Party (BNP) (and in the lead up to the 2015 General Elections, the far-right, anti-European United Kingdom Independence Party -UKIP) has captured votes among the white working classes by mobilizing a language of ethnic victimhood that presents immigrants and members of ethnic and racial minority groups as the beneficiaries of preferential treatment on the part of the state (see also Cohen 1996; Evans 2012; Rhodes 2011; Smith 2012a ).
My ethnographic research on the council estate focused on a local independent party that was active on the estate from 2002 to 2012, the Free Worker's Party (FWP). 2 The FWP was in many ways a typical populist working class party: it rejected both the policies of meritocracy and multiculturalism at the heart of the New Labour government and the politics of the local Labour party that dominated the city where the FWP became active. But the FWP also saw itself as a left-wing alternative to the far right, in particular to the BNP, as it objected to their ethnic identity politics and instead aspired to build a movement based on solidarity and class 8 consciousness. It attempted this through a strategy of "bread and butter" -an approach that focused on residents' daily needs and the localized networks through which residents addressed them. The term "bread and butter" was coined by one of the party's supporters when once describing the party's activities to me, but I should be clear that party members did not officially endorse the term, nor would they necessarily say that "bread and butter"
was the end goal of their political mission. 3 It was, however, central to the party's initial electoral success among residents on the estates.
By tracing the electoral rise and fall of the party, I reflect on how people engage with voting, and by extension with politics, as vernacular processes, that is to say as processes that take on locally-specific meanings (Banerjee 2011; Coles 2004; Grisaffi 2013; Paley 2008; Spencer 1997 ). On the estate, people "tame" what they experience as an alien and distant political system by building personalized relations with politicians that are co-extensive with their own logics of mutual support and care. Nonetheless personalized politics rarely translate into a platform for collective action as they struggle to attain legitimacy in the public sphere.
Ultimately the failure of local politicians to establish themselves as credible alternatives sheds light on the precariousness of working class movements at a time when political elites have narrowed the meaning of democracy and dismantled the infrastructural and political framework that legitimated working class voices. It also complicates aspirational narratives of "alternative" democratic futures which have highlighted the need to break with received forms of representative democracy (Hardt and Negri 2011; Juris 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 2012) by emphasizing the need to engage more critically with the material realities of social class.
The rise and fall of independent politics on an English council estate FWP's founders, a small group of self-proclaimed working class people, sought to create an alternative to the major political parties. Although they had no explicit affiliation with any existing left parties, many of the members had been active in earlier anti-fascist and anticapitalist movements. The FWP's opposition was directed against the Labour Party which the FWP felt had "ditched the working class" with its politics of multiculturalism and meritocracy that became central to its third way politics upon being elected into government in 1997. It also feared that the far right, crucially the BNP, would fill the void created by the Labour Party's abandonment of the working class through its rhetoric of victimhood that saw ethnic and racial minorities as benefiting from preferential treatment at the expense of their white British counterparts. To provide a credible working class alternative, the FWP reasoned that a movement must be built from the bottom-up through localized working class mobilization that took seriously the needs of ordinary working class people.
The party had singled out the estate where I worked as a favorable place to pursue its politics:
electoral turn out for both general and local elections had been low for decades, falling to levels of twenty per cent for local elections prior to the FWP becoming active. 5 Historically, the estate had been Labour Party heartland. The local Labour MP had represented his constituency in Parliament for over thirty years. His wife was also active in local governance and was a Labour councilor. Yet many residents had little respect for the Labour Party. Those who voted for Labour tended to do so not because of the MP and his wife's party affiliation but because they considered them to be "locals" who could relate to the estate and its people.
People told me that they "do not believe in Labour" but that they trusted their MP because of the work that he had put into the estate over the years. While the FWP's initial electoral success reflected its ability to become embedded in localized exchange relations through its pursuit of a "bread and butter" politics, the party was ultimately unable to maintain the obligations that followed from such an alliance, thereby engendering yet further electoral withdrawal and reinforcing democratic disenchantment.
Democratic disenchantment
The history of post-war British council estates is a history of gradual economic and political to be eligible for council housing, prospective residents frequently had to provide proof of income as council rents still tended to be higher than in the private rental market.
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Paternalistic forms of rent and housing management control were common in the early days of post-war council housing as council tenants were carefully policed by a plethora of state officials, including social workers, housing officers, and rent collectors (Ravetz 2001) .
Industrial decline and neo-liberal reform since the Thatcher years has had profound effects on council estates and working class lives across the country (Hanley 2007; Rogaly and Taylor 2009 ). In the city where I worked, the car factory had started undergoing tumultuous periods of restructuring by the mid-1980s. At the time of my fieldwork, the factory employed a mere fraction of its original labor force, with many of its workers hired on short-term contracts.
The rise of an increasingly service-oriented economy has not created sufficient replacement jobs for a local population largely without higher educational qualifications. Local unemployment hovers around twenty per cent, and people are trapped in poorly paid jobs as cooks, drivers, shop assistants, or cleaners. The estate has also been affected by the privatization of the social housing sector, introduced by the "Right to Buy" legislation in 1980 which permitted existing council tenants to buy their houses below market value.
Today, nearly fifty per cent of the houses on the estate are privately owned. Residents who cannot afford to buy are forced to compete over ever more scarce social housing, with many being pushed into an insecure and over-priced private rental market. , well,   14 you know, a lot of them politicians, they think 'Oh, it's really comfortable here', and they change, and they don't care about us."
Given such widespread mistrust in the formal political system, withdrawal from electoral politics became for many residents a reasonable and a socially expected response. "Why should I vote?" a resident in her late forties asked me defiantly when I pressed her, "They just do what they want, so there's no point in me voting!" The same logic also applied to participation in political organizations, principally trade unions, which most residents considered to be merely "closed shops." People also made conscious efforts to keep politics away from their everyday life. For instance, it was considered rude to "talk politics" in social settings, particularly in the pub or in people's homes, and when I tried to raise political issues in these settings, people often claimed that they did not "know anything" or didn't "want anything to do with politics." Lindsey, a local resident in her late thirties and a mother of South Asians (although their presence in the city was strong). One reason for this could be that historically migrants from South Asian backgrounds had moved to other neighborhoods in the same city and there are comparatively speaking few of them living on the estate today.
The chief criterion for distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, or between the "us" and "them." is not along racial and ethnic lines but rather according to a distinction between "locals" and "non-locals." To be "local" means to be embedded in the localized relations of support and care, and to be able to claim loyalty to particular individuals, families, as well as to the places that they inhabit (Degnen 2013) . In this respect, people attribute foreignness or difference to those who they do not consider "local," while emphasizing similarity and connectedness with reference to those they know. For example, in my own experience, it was only by investing time into relations with residents at the local community center where I was based and by partaking in my host families' daily life that my status gradually changed from being a "researcher" or "student" to being a "local resident," a "friend," or even fictive "member of the family." But the point does not only apply to anthropologists. Crucially, anyone otherwise associated with the world of "them" can be appropriated into the "us" by proving themselves through their actions. A particular housing officer or a council worker can be considered "one of us" if they have made an effort to get to know residents and to integrate themselves into local life (Koch 2014) .
Understanding these processes of personalization is crucial when it comes to analyzing the role of locally based politicians. As Heredia and Palmeira (2013) Jane also mentioned that it was more important to vote in local elections than to vote in general elections because "they are more relevant to my life." This is a point I heard many times, although the term "local" elections could, rather confusingly, be used to refer to general elections where people were speaking about "their" local MP.
It is against this backdrop that we have to understand how the FWP managed to mobilize electoral support. The efficacy of its "bread and butter" politics resided precisely in the extent to which it became active in residents' daily pursuits for security and protection. The party Second, the FWP was active in residents' everyday networks of sociality. As Lazar (2004) has pointed out in relation to political clientelism in Bolivia, to understand how rapport is established between politicians and citizens, we need to pay attention to the affective or noninstrumental aspects of politics. Tony Smith, who was born in the city and who had worked there most of his life, was widely known as a neighbor, family member, and resident. He was already integrated into local life before he started working there politically. When Smith invited me to stay with him, his wife, and two children in their small two-bedroom socially rented tenancy, I saw friends pop over for tea, neighbors bringing over left-over food from Sunday roast dinners, and residents stopping to chat on the street. Smith and his party also organized various outings, leisure activities, and sports tournaments for the party's own athletics club during which the ethics of sharing that was so central to community life was enacted. itself: "I voted for them 'cos they were a local party, they were for people from this estate,"
another resident told me.
To sum up, the FWP mobilized support on the estate by practicing a vernacular form of politics: one that derived its legitimacy not from its association with the formal political system but rather from its submission to local networks and their logic of support and care. In this process, voting can be understood not as an exercise in abstract or depersonalized rights, but rather as part of a personalized exchange relationship. And yet, six years after having four councilors elected to the city council, the FWP had lost all of its seats. This raises the question of what caused the downfall of the party.
Betrayal
In his analysis of the gift, Mauss (1992) demonstrated that exchange locks people into ongoing relations of debt: each act is only one instance of a whole web of rights and obligations as people are expected to reciprocate an act of favour rendered to them in the future. Among residents on the estate, there was a strong expectation that relations carry commitments over time. This also brought the possibility of being let down as an ever-present threat. One of the most common, but also severe, insults was to accuse someone of being "selfish" and of exploiting one's own kindness. On the estate, where life was marked by the unpredictability of material hardship, the scope for such accusations was wide. Proving one's loyalty or commitment could be onerous: requests for sharing money and housing could easily place individuals on the verge of financial ruin, or force them to make difficult decisions between 21 helping family and placing themselves in conflict with social welfare agencies and the law.
For example, on several occasions, I observed women feeling pressured to put up a partner or a grown up child even where this led to breaking official rules that provided benefits only to the sole occupier of a home .
Just as people fear betrayal by family and friends, they also have high expectations of individual state officials and politicians who they have established relationships with. As people often told me, they were "tired" and "sick" of outsiders who "come into the local community, do their bit and then leave again" (an accusation that I, as an anthropologist, was not immune to). I quickly recognized the fragility of such relations. In the many cases I witnessed, people felt that individual state officials had failed to attend to their needs or requests for help. These officials were described as "traitors" or sometimes as "criminals"
and "crooks" who had turned out to be "no better than the rest." Local politicians too were expected to work hard to maintain support over time. People I spoke to emphasized that politicians need to "earn their votes" and that they had to "deserve" the support from local people. One local resident who, in the past had run for local councilor, when I asked why people should vote for him, said: "…because I've lived on this estate for so long. And I've done so much for this estate. I'm not a politician, I'm from this estate."
Against this backdrop, the FWP struggled to live up to its perceived obligations. Local authorities and the Labour Party actively resisted the FWP's aggressive opposition to the local establishment. Housing officers and council officials reported to me how "angry" and "hostile" the FWP had been, sometimes taking this as evidence of their "anti-authority" and "anti-democratic" thinking. They also labeled the party's policing activities of local drug dealers and anti-social tenants as "vigilantism" and "witch hunt politics" intended to cause the "downfall" of a few select individuals living on the estates. But it was not just the party's campaigning activities on the grassroots level that were under attack: the authorities called This quote makes clear that there was a direct link between the FWP's struggles to establish itself as political party and its subsequent loss of support. When speaking to residents about the FWP, I was often told of the hard work that Tony Smith and the party had done for people on the estate. Many said that they "did not know what had happened to the party" or that they
were not sure "where they had gone." But others were more forthcoming in their criticism:
for them, the FWP's inability to deliver, let alone expand on its initial activities, amounted to a personal betrayal. The FWP's work had raised their expectations that they would be different from the other parties. Mandy, a resident in her forties, felt that they had turned out to be "no better than the rest": she told me that the party had just "sort of disappeared like all the others who come and go." In a subsequent conversation, she reiterated some of the public allegations against the party, telling me that she did not like how the FWP had "caused the downfall of particular people on the estate," and that they had been "a bit racist" for targeting black drug dealers.
Ironically, the FWP's short-lived history on the estate may have had the opposite effect from what it had intended to achieve: far from radicalizing local people and building a working class movement, it may well have ended up reinforcing widespread disenfranchisement and anxiety. It is in this sense that we have to understand the statement made by Tony Smith at the beginning of this article that "people start to see you as part of the system you're trying to change." Claire, a local woman in her thirties, told me that she used to vote for a "localist representatives. While the FWP was ultimately committed to setting up a class-based movement, its means of mobilizing a largely apathetic electorate were very different from this long-term goal: its campaigning strategies were focused on the pursuit of a "bread and butter" politics that emphasized the need to address the immediate and everyday concerns of residents on the estates. By pursuing a politics of brokerage and by assuming, to limited extent, state functions themselves, the FWP managed to mobilize electoral support. At the same time, however, the party quickly lost its seats as it failed to establish itself as a political alternative. This failure was due to the de-legitimization of the FWP because of the onslaught the party faced from the city's establishment and its own limited resources in the face of it.
For residents, the party's inability to attend to their needs, let alone expand on their initial activities, amounted to prove that they were ultimately no better than the rest. While we need to seriously consider politics as practiced by those on the margins, we must not lost sight of the difficulties of translating "bread and butter" politics into a sustained platform for collective action. This may well be less of a problem when dealing with electoral politics on a local level: in the UK, the localized nature of municipal elections (as opposed to general elections) has always allowed a greater space for such politics, as it has in other places (e.g. Grisaffi 2013; Medeiros 2001; Nonini et al. 2007 ). But when it comes to a more general politics of representation, "bread and butter" politics needs broader alliances to succeed. This was something that the members of the FWP were aware of in their own intention to build a movement that, ultimately, would be founded around issues of solidarity and class. Historically, it appears that "bread and butter" politics was most effective when institutional mechanisms and appropriate political channels were in place that legitimated localized demands and that could translate them into general policies of welfare and labor. As Evans (2012) has shown, working class support for the Labour Party in the post-war decades was mediated precisely through paternalistic housing policies that reinforced localized kinship and neighborhood connections rather than an abstract identification with party politics.
Judged from this perspective, the failure of the FWP to build a sustained political alternative is perhaps most telling of the dismantling of the political left and the lack of legitimacy of working class politics in the current moment. As my case study has shown, a crucial factor in explaining the downfall of the party was precisely its inability to establish itself as a publicly accepted alternative at a moment when mainstream politics has become de-captured from the voices and needs of the poor. When the FWP succeeded in being elected to the local council, it faced allegations of vigilante, anti-democratic, and even extremist practice -accusations that pushed the party into an isolated position. While these denunciations were part of the usual tit-for-tat that characterizes relations between political opponents and their parties, they also revealed so much more: they reflected the lack of political and institutional support for independent political movements and the difficulties facing alternatives to the political status quo. The FWP's story draws attention to a broader point (Braconnier and Mayer 2015; Friedmann 2003; Gingrich and Banks 2005) -namely that a retreat to defensive populism may be only space left to working class people in the current political system.
Given the lack of a political and ideological framework that can "scale up" and render legitimate the voices of alternative or independent movements, it may well be time to experiment with alternative democratic practices that do away with the system of representative democracy itself. Such is the suggestion of what may be called "alternative" or "active" democracies that have formed around Occupy and other recent protest movements (Butler 2011; Hardt and Negri 2011; Juris 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 2012) Negri (2011) put it: "If democracy -that is the democracy that we have been given -is staggering under the blows of the economic crisis and is powerless to assert the will and 28 interests of the multitude, then is now perhaps the moment to consider the form of democracy obsolete?"
The analysis offered here is sympathetic to the premise that representative democracy is in crisis. I am less optimistic about the claim that the politics of Occupy are indicative of a new "politics-in-the-becoming" (Razsa and Kurnik 2012, 249 ) that allow citizens to articulate "shared visions and goals from the bottom up" (Juris 2012, 261) . While this may well be the case for largely middle-class occupiers caught up in the spirit of protest, for many working class people the emphasis placed on form over practice, or process over substance, is far removed from their own reality of struggling for a "bread and butter" politics. As Shah puts it, "fantasies of the future need to be linked with the prosaic material workings of the present in order to analyse and resolve the contradictions in the present which prevent radical transformations from coming about" (2012, 350) . The transnational character of Occupy, with its emphasis on building a global community of citizens, may well be antithetical to working class people's concerns about localized communities and their position as embedded in place-based networks of support that have increasingly come under threat with neo-liberal housing policies and financial capitalization. Unless activists and scholars can adequately acknowledge and theorize these differences there is a danger that the recent protest movements will end up perpetuating class divides both in rhetoric and in practice -and in this process, forego the opportunity to redefine the conditions for more inclusive democratic futures.
